Posthumously Conceived Children and Social Security Survivor\u27s Benefits: Implications of the Ninth Circuit\u27s Novel Approach For Determining Eligibility in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart by Minor, Karen
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 35
Issue 1 Ninth Circuit Survey Article 6
January 2005
Posthumously Conceived Children and Social
Security Survivor's Benefits: Implications of the
Ninth Circuit's Novel Approach For Determining
Eligibility in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart
Karen Minor
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Family Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Karen Minor, Posthumously Conceived Children and Social Security Survivor's Benefits: Implications of the Ninth Circuit's Novel Approach




CHILDREN AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS: 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT'S NOVEL APPROACH FOR 
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY IN 
GILLETT-NETTING V. BARNHART 
INTRODUCTION 
With the emergence of modern reproductive technology, 
freedom of choice does not guarantee freedom from legal confu-
sion. One expression of this freedom is the availability of al-
ternatives to the traditional means of conception. Medical 
technology allows parents to choose from several methods of 
assisted reproduction to conceive a child, from artificial in-
semination to fertilization outside of the womb using frozen 
sperm and eggs. However, many of those choices can lead to 
uncertainty regarding the legal status of the resulting child. 
With assisted reproduction, children can be both conceived and 
born after one or both parents have died. The rights of these 
posthumously conceived children have not been fully estab-
lished. 
The Ninth Circuit considered the rights of children con-
ceived using new reproductive technology in Gillett-Netting v. 
85 
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Barnhart.' In this case of first impression, the plaintiff, 
Rhonda Gillett-Netting, applied to the Social Security Admini-
stration (hereinafter "Administration") for survivorship bene-
fits for her twin minor children who were conceived by in vitro 
fertilization ten months after her insured husband's death.2 
The Administration denied benefits to the children.s Although 
the United States District Court for the District of Arizona up-
held the Administration's denial of benefits, a panel of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that 
the children met the requirements of the Social Security Act 
(hereinafter "the Act") and that they were entitled to survivor's 
benefits: 
The determination of eligibility for benefits under the Act 
turns on two issues: the definition of "child" and a finding of 
dependency: Contrary to the decisions of the Administration 
and the lower court in this case and the reasoning of courts in 
other jurisdictions, the Ninth Circuit's determination of 
whether the children met the defmition of "child" under the Act 
did not rest on the children's right to inherit from their father 
under state intestacy law. Rather, it rested on their legitimacy 
under state law." This Note discusses this shift in the standard 
for defining a "child." 
At the time of the Gillett-Netting decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit was the only federal court of appeals to consider whether a 
child conceived by in vitro fertilization after the death of one 
parent is entitled to receive benefits as a survivor under the 
Act. 7 The ruling of the Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting is a de-
1 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 
2 [d. at 595. 
3 [d. 
• [d. at 599. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(l) (2004) ("Every child (as defined in section 
416(e) of this title) of an individual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, 
or of an individual who dies a fully or currently insured individual, if such child (A) has 
filed application for child's insurance benefits, (B) at the time such application was 
filed was unmarried and (i) either had not attained the age of 18 or was a full-time 
elementary or secondary school student and had not attained the age of 19, or (ii) is 
under a disability (as defined in section 423(d) of this title) which began before he at-
tained the age of 22, and (C) was dependent upon such individual (i) if such individual 
is living, at the time such application was filed, (ii) if such individual has died, at the 
time of such death ... shall be entitled to a child's insurance benefit."). 
• 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2004) (defining "child" as "the child or legally adopted child 
of an individual... "). 
• Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597. 
7 [d. at 596. 
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parture from the internal Administration rulings in all cases 
examined, both in the outcome and in the factors used in that 
determination. Even those state courts whose rulings were in 
agreement with the Ninth Circuit used different factors to de-
termine eligibility for Social Security survivor benefits. 
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Gillett-Netting was limited to 
the facts of that case. It is unclear whether its reasoning will 
be persuasive in subsequent cases that address the issue of 
survivor benefits for posthumously conceived children. With 
eligibility based partially on state law, and with the majority of 
states not yet having determined the rights of these children, it 
is clear that this federal law will not be applied uniformly 
across all states within the Ninth Circuit. Therefore, this deci-
sion demonstrates the need for clarification of the terms used 
in the Act. Without these changes, the goals of the Administra-
tion, including providing support for dependents of an msured 
wage earner and avoiding individual determinations of de-
pendency, will not be met." To the contrary, variations in state 
intestate succession laws that contradict the standard put forth 
by the court will require case-by-case determination of eligibil-
ity for each posthumously conceived child who applies for bene-
fits and could lead to the inconsistent distribution of benefits. 
Part I of this Note describes the technology of assisted re-
production, the requirements and purpose of the Act, and the 
challenges that arise when interpreting the Act using the vari-
ety of state statutes." Part II describes the instant case and 
explores the reasoning of both the district court and the Ninth 
Circuit. 10 The implications of the decision are discussed in Part 
IlL" 
I. BACKGROUND 
The issue in this case has as its source the intersection of 
new reproductive technologies and the requirements for quali-
fying for survivor benefits under the Act. The situation is fur-
8 See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974) (stating the purpose of 
the Act is to provide support for children born before or after a wage earner becomes 
disabled); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52 (1977) (discussing Congress's use of catego-
ries to determine dependency rather than requiring individualized proof). 
9 See infra notes 12-71 and accompanying text. 
,. See infra notes 72-119 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 120-155 and accompanying text. 
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ther complicated by having this qualification based in part on 
state law when those laws have not always developed to en-
compass the new technology. As a result, the goals of the Act 
are not always met by the application of the law. 
A. CURRENT REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
To determine eligibility for benefits, the Act relies on tradi-
tional concepts of the parent-child relationship and presumed 
or actual dependency. This reliance makes it difficult to apply 
the Act in cases involving claimants conceived by assisted re-
production. To understand these difficulties, a description of 
current reproductive technology provides a basic understand-
ing of the various methods of assisted reproduction. 
One of the oldest and simplest methods of assisted repro-
duction is artificial insemination, which involves placing the 
sperm (from the husband or other male donor) into the vagina 
or uterus of the woman.12 A more sophisticated procedure is 
in vitro fertilization (hereinafter "IVF"), in which the woman's 
ovum is fertilized outside the body and allowed to develop into 
a pre-embryo, which is then implanted into the woman's 
uterus. IS A related technology is gamete intrafallopian transfer 
(hereinafter "GIFT")," whereby, similar to IVF, the sperm and 
ovum are removed from the bodies but then are transferred to 
the woman's fallopian tube, where fertilization occurs. 15 Yet 
another method is embryo lavage and transfer, in which the 
ovum is fertilized in one woman, and then the embryo is trans-
ferred to a second woman, who will carry it to term.'6 
These methods of conception are traditionally used by cou-
ples or single women using donated ova, sperm, or both. In 
most cases, the status of the resulting children is not ques-
tioned because the donating parties are living or are anony-
mous with no interest in the offspring. In some cases, however, 
12 Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Proposed Amendments to 
the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technology, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 
335, 337 (1994). 
13 Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent· Child Relationship in an Age of Repro-
ductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. 55, 61 
(1994). 
14 Djalleta, supra note 13, at 338. 
15 McAllister, supra note 14, at 64. 
16 Id. at 64-65. 
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modern technology has enabled doctors to harvest sperm from 
the body of a recently deceased man to be used to impregnate a 
woman.17 Currently, sperm, ova, fertilized eggs, and embryos 
can be preserved using the process of cryopreservation for use 
at some future date.'B Because of this technology, births can 
occur theoretically hundreds of years after the death of either 
(or both) parents.19 
B. SOCIAL SECURITY ACT 
1. Requirements Under the Social Security Act 
Under the Act, establishment of the parent-child relation-
ship is important because a claimant for benefits must meet 
two requirements. First, a claimant must be the child of an 
insured individual, as that term is defined in the Act. 20 Second, 
a claimant must be dependent on the insured wage earner at 
the time of his or her death.21 Because the term "child" is de-
fined only minimally by the Act, interpretation of the term un-
der state law becomes central to the determination of whether 
an individual is entitled to survivor's benefits.22 
The term "child" is defined under the Act as any "child or 
legally adopted child of an individual."23 The Act also states 
that "child" status can be established if the claimant would be 
considered a child of the insured individual under the intestate 
succession laws of the state where the deceased resided at 
death, or if the marriage of the child's parents was invalid only 
because of some previously unknown legal impediment.24 In 
addition, the following actions taken before the insured wage 
earner dies can also bestow "child" status on the claimant: ac-
knowledgment in writing by the deceased that the claimant is 
his or her child, a decree by a court that the deceased is the 
17 Doctor Details Sperm Removal from Dead Man, L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1995, at 
20. 
18 McAllister, supra note 13, at 62-63 (1994) (explaining that in cryopreserva-
tion, embryos and eggs are cooled and dehydrated for long-term frozen storage; semen 
is also frozen for long-term storage in sperm banks). 
19 Djalleta, supra note 12, at 335. 
20 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2004). 
2142 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2004). 
22 [d. 
23 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2004) 
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2)(A), (B) (2004). 
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parent of the claimant, or a court order requiring the deceased 
to pay support for the claimant because he or she is the child of 
the deceased.2• 
The Seventh Circuit has adhered to a strict requirement 
for a court decree of paternity before the death of the insured 
parent in order for the child to receive benefits!6 The United 
States Supreme Court has also upheld the denial of benefits 
based on the lack of a formal parent-child relationship. In 
Mathews v. Lucas, as in Gillett-Netting, the fact that the dece-
dent was the children's father was not disputed.27 However, 
even though the children were born during the nearly 20 years 
that he lived with their mother, the father never acknowledged 
his paternity in writing, nor was it determined by a judicial 
proceeding during his lifetime. 28 As a result, the Supreme 
Court found that the children did not qualify for Social Security 
benefits because they were "non-marital" (Le., illegitimate) and 
did not satisfy any of the requirements for dependency!· 
The determination of dependency is closely related to the 
legitimacy of the child. The Act distinguishes marital (Le., le-
gitimate) children, meaning those children born to a married 
couple, from non-marital children, or those children born out of 
wedlock, when determining eligibility for survivor death bene-
fits."o Marital children are presumed dependent and entitled to 
Social Security survivor benefits if the deceased parent was 
insured.a, Non-marital children, however, must show that they 
were actually dependent upon their deceased father before they 
are considered eligible for survivor benefits because non-
marital children who do not live with their father or do not re-
ceive support from him are not deemed dependent.a2 One who 
is determined to be a child of the deceased based on the exis-
tence of any of the conditions in §416(h)(3) of the Act is also 
considered legitimate and therefore dependent.aa 
,. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (2004). 
26 Trammell v. Bowen, 819 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1987) (denying benefits to children 
when the judgment of paternity was obtained four months after the death of the fa-
ther). 
27 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,501 (1976). 
28 [d. at 497. 
29 [d. at 50l. 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(l)(C) and § 402(d)(3)(A). 
31 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3)(A). 
32 [d. 
33 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C). 
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When the Administration denies benefits to non-marital 
children born after the father dies or becomes disabled, it is 
because the children cannot show the requisite economic de-
pendency on the wage earner that would entitle them to re-
cover under the Act."· However, a showing of actual depend-
ency is not a condition of eligibility in every case."5 Under cer-
tain circumstances, a child can be deemed dependent by stat-
ute and does not have to demonstrate actual dependency or 
prove paternity in order to qualify for benefits. 36 
2. Purpose of the Act 
The primary purpose of Social Security survivor's benefits, 
according to the United States Supreme Court, is to provide 
support for dependents of a deceased insured wage earner, in-
cluding anticipated support from a parent who has died. 37 The 
Ninth Circuit has further defined one goal of the Act as being 
to provide income security to family units, not simply to aid 
individual blood relatives of the wage earner.3S For example, 
persons who have never worked (and therefore never contrib-
uted to the Social Security fund) are able to collect benefits un-
der certain circumstances.39 These "secondary beneficiaries" 
are not only blood relatives, but are also generally defined as 
those persons who were dependent on the wage earner at the 
time of his death or disability:o 
One goal of the Administration is to avoid adjudicating the 
question of dependency in individual claims.'· The Administra-
tion has created categories of beneficiaries for purposes of de-
termining dependency!2 Instead of requiring individualized 
proof on a case-by-case basis, the Administration has elected to 
use criteria such as age, marital status, and eligibility under 
34 Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 633. 
35 Califano, 434 U.S. at 52. 
36 Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 635. 
37 [d. at 634; see also Califano, 434 U.S. at 50; Tsosie v. Califano, 630 F.2d 1328. 
1337 (9th Cir. 1980); Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir. 1975). 
38 Sims v. Harris, 607 F.2d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1979). 
39 [d. 
40 Califano, 434 U.S. at 50. 
41 [d. at 52. 
42 Trammell, 819 F.2d at 169. 
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state intestate succession laws to determine probable depend-
ency.43 
C. CASE LAW INTERPRETING THE ACT 
New reproductive technologies raise several legal issues. 
This Note concentrates on the status of posthumously con-
ceived children, that is, the newer category of children who are 
both conceived and born after the death of a parent using fro-
zen sperm, eggs, or embryos. Case law concerning this cate-
gory of children is sparse. As a result, this Note explores the 
status of another category of children in the context of eligibil-
ity for Social Security benefits. Specifically, this Note com-
pares the status of posthumously conceived children with non-
marital children whose fathers have died. 
Cases that interpret the Act in relation to non-marital 
children discuss issues of dependency by comparing marital 
and non-marital children. A posthumously conceived child may 
arguably be likened to a non-marital child because the living 
parent is no longer married once the spouse has died. In some 
states, being conceived and born after a parent dies would pre-
clude the child from establishing a legal relationship with the 
deceased parent and prevent the child from qualifying for bene-
fits. « 
1. Non-Marital Children 
Marital children born before the wage earner/parent dies 
or becomes disabled are entitled to benefits regardless of 
whether they were living with or being supported by the parent 
at the time of his or her death or disability,,5 Similarly, marital 
children born after the wage earner/parent becomes disabled 
are entitled to benefits even though they were not alive at the 
.. See, e.g., Califano, 434 U.S. at 52 ("A child who is married or over 18 and nei-
ther disabled nor a student is denied benefits because Congress has assumed that such 
a child is not normally dependent on his parents.") . 
.. See N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-04 (1991). The North Dakota statute is based on 
the USCACA and states in part that "[al person who dies before conception using his 
sperm or her eggs is not a parent of any resulting child born of the conception." The 
statute even explicitly provides that a posthumously conceived child may not take as 
an heir through intestate succession, although the child may be provided for in a will. 
N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-04 (1991). 
.. Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 634. 
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time the parent became disabled.'6 Non-marital children may 
qualify for benefits if state law permits them to inherit from 
the wage earner, their illegitimacy results solely from a formal, 
non-obvious defect in their parents' marriage, or they are le-
gitimated in accordance with state law." 
Because non-marital children are not presumed depend-
ent, the courts will look to the father's contribution to the sup-
port of the child in determining whether to grant Social Secu-
rity survivor benefits to the child.,a For example, the Ninth 
Circuit considered whether a father's support of an unborn 
child was sufficient to entitle the child to benefits after the fa-
ther killed himself when his girlfriend was three-months preg-
nant.'9 The court held that a child is deemed dependent on the 
father if the father's support "was commensurate with the 
needs of the unborn child at the time of the father's death."50 In 
using this standard, the court rejected the more stringent test 
used by the Administrative Law Judge in the Social Security 
Administration hearing. 51 That test required that the father 
contribute support in a "regular and substantial manner" dur-
ing the mother's pregnancy.52 This is significant for posthu-
mously conceived children because they could never qualify for 
benefits under the more stringent test. 
2. Posthumously Conceived Children 
As illustrated in the following cases, the Administration 
has generally denied benefits to children who are both con-
ceived and born after the death of their father. The decisions 
to deny benefits have been based variously on facts that would 
also result in the denial of benefits to non-marital children: the 
46 1d. 
47 1d. 
48 42 u.s.c. § 402(d)(3) . 
." Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 1982) (adopting the test from 
Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975), as the basis for determining that an 
illegitimate, posthumously born child was dependent on its father). 
50 1d. at 608-609 (citing Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975». 
Although the child's father and the pregnant woman did not live together and the 
father did not provide her with fmancial support, he did help with moving and home 
repairs. The court considered this support to be commensurate with his abilities as an 
unemployed person and found that it met the needs of the fetus. As a result, the court 
awarded benefits to the child. Doran, 681 F.2d at 608. 
5' Doran, 681 F.2d at 607. 
52 1d. at 608. 
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child cannot inherit under the applicable state laws for intes-
tate succession, the child was never acknowledged by the fa-
ther, there was no proof or decree of paternity, or the child 
could not show actual dependency on the father. 
In Hart v. Shalala (hereinafter "Hart"), the child's mother 
filed for social security survivor's benefits for her child, who 
was conceived by GIFT and born twelve months after the death 
of her father.53 The Administration denied the claim on the 
ground that the child was not the father's legal child.54 The 
Administration first reasoned that the child was not a qualified 
heir under Louisiana law because she was neither alive at the 
time of her father's death nor was she born within 300 days of 
his death. 55 Second, the child was also considered illegitimate 
because she was born more than 300 days after her parents' 
marriage ended (upon the death of her father)56 and paternity 
was not proven within the statutorily required period. 57 Third, 
she was unable to ever prove paternity because her father had 
not acknowledged her as his child before he died.58 
Hart appealed the Administration's denial of benefits. Fol-
lowing a de novo review, the Administrative Law Judge (here-
inafter "ALJ") awarded survivor's benefits to both the child and 
her mother, based on the finding of a biological connection be-
tween the child and her deceased father.59 Following appeal by 
the Administration of the ALJ's decision, the Appeals Council 
of the Administration accepted that the posthumously con-
ceived child was the biological child of the father, but it over-
turned the decision of the ALJ on the ground that the child was 
not dependent on her father at the time of his death:o The case 
was eventually resolved in favor of the claimants when the So-
cial Security Commissioner determined that survivor benefits 
would be paid to the child on public policy grounds.61 The de-
.. See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: 
Social Security Survivor's Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 Loy. LA. 
L. Rev 251 (1999) (describing Hart v. Shalala No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. 1994)) . 
.. [d. at 252. 
55 See La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 934,953,954,957 (West 1997). 
'" See La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 178-180, 184 (West 1993). 
07 See La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 209 (West 1997). 
58 Banks, supra note 54, at 253. See also La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 184, 185 (West 
1991)). 
59 Banks, supra note 54, at 254. 
60 [d. at 255. 
6' [d. at 256. 
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ceased father's intent to allow his wife to use his sperm to con-
ceive a child after his death was crucial to this decision.62 
The intent of the deceased father was also one of the decid-
ing factors in In re Kolacy, in which twin children were con-
ceived by IVF and born 18 months after the death of their fa-
ther."" In that case, the children's mother asked the New Jer-
sey Superior Court for a determination of the status of her 
children as intestate heirs to her deceased husband's estate.S4 
The New Jersey state court determined that the children were 
the offspring of their father and held that the children should 
be granted "the legal status of being ... heir[s]of the decedent, 
unless doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other 
persons or would cause serious problems in terms of the orderly 
administration of estates."65 Although not binding on the Ad-
ministration, a favorable ruling would likely be helpful to the 
plaintiff in her later federal claims for survivor benefits before 
the Administration because the determination of whether an 
applicant is a "child" under the Act is based in part on the law 
of intestate succession of the state in which the insured indi-
vidual was domiciled at the time of death.66 
The question of inheritance rights was also central in 
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security (hereinafter 
"Woodward"), a case involving twins conceived by artificial in-
semination and born 24 months after the death of their father.67 
The United States District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts asked the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to re-
view the question whether children conceived and born after 
the death of their father have the same inheritance rights as 
natural children under the Massachusetts law of intestate suc-
cession.68 At stake again were survivor's benefits for the chil-
dren under the Act.69 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
court held that a posthumously conceived child has such in-
heritance rights if all of the following circumstances exist: (1) a 
62 [d. at 254. 
63 In re Kolacy, 332 N.J. Super. 593 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000). 
54 [d. at 595. 
65 [d. at 602. 
66 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(a)(A). 
67 Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security, 760 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Mass. 
2002). 
66 [d. at 259. 
69 [d. at 260. 
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genetic relationship between the deceased and the child is es-
tablished, (2) the decedent consented not only to the posthu-
mous conception, but also to the support of any resulting chil-
dren, and (3) any statutory time limitations are met and notice 
is given to all interested parties.7• 
II. GILLETI'-NETI'ING V. BARNHART 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION To DENY BENEFITS 
After the Administration denied benefits to the minor chil-
dren in Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart (hereinafter "Gillett-
Netting"), the plaintiff appealed to the Arizona district court.7l 
In making its determination, the district court addressed the 
question whether the children met the requirements of the Act: 
whether they were "natural children" as defined by the Act, 
and whether they were dependent on their father.72 
1. Determination of "Child" Status 
The twins' designation as natural children depended on 
whether they could inherit from their father under Arizona 
law." The district court determined that the twins were not 
"natural" children based on the facts that they were born out-
side of marriage (in fact, they were not yet conceived at the 
time of their father's death) and that they could not inherit 
from the deceased under Arizona intestate succession laws." 
Accordingly, the children were not presumed to be dependent 
upon the deceased. 75 Moreover, the plaintiff could not show ac-
tual dependency; because the children were not in existence at 
the time of their father's death, he could not have been contrib-
uting to their support.76 
70 Id. at 259. 
71 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 599. 
72 Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 964 (D. Ariz. 2002). 
73 Id. at 965. 
7. Id. at 963. 
7. Id. at 967. 
76Id. 
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Posthumously conceived children do not fit neatly into any 
of the definitions of "child" provided in the Act. 77 The plaintiff 
took the position that her twins were the "natural" children of 
her deceased husband for purposes of the Act because he was 
undisputedly their biological father. 78 The district court looked 
for the definition of "child" in the Act by examining the provi-
sion that is used for determining family status.79 From this sec-
tion, the district court decided that the twins' status as chil-
dren was dependent upon the intestate succession laws of Ari-
zona.so 
Arizona intestate succession law has no explicit provision 
for posthumously conceived children. Given this omission, the 
plaintiff contended that her children should be presumed to be 
included in the class of descendants that qualify as heirs be-
cause Arizona law does not specifically exclude them.S! She 
also argued that the timing of the conception of the children 
and her marital status at that time· were irrelevant. At the 
district court level, the Social Security Commissioner argued 
that under Arizona law, children must exist at the time of the 
insured party's death in order to receive survivor benefits. s2 
The district court agreed with the Social Security Commis-
sioner's assessment, citing the requirement that heirs must 
survive the decedent. S3 The only exception to this requirement 
is for children "in gestation" at the time of their father's death.so 
The Gillett-Netting twins, who were born over a year after the 
death of their father, clearly did not fit this exception. Because 
the children were not born during the period of their parents' 
marriage and could not inherit from the deceased under Ari-
77 42 USC § 416(e) (defIning the term "child" to mean (1) the child or legally 
adopted child of an individual, (2) a stepchild, and (3) a person who is the grandchild or 
stepgrandchild of an individual or his spouse (under certain circumstances)). 
78 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 965. 
79 42 USC § 416(h)(2)(A) ("In determining whether an applicant is the child or 
parent of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this title ... , the Com-
missioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining 
the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such 
insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application .... Appli-
cants who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intes-
tate personal property as a child or parent shall be deemed such.") 
ao Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 966. 
81 [d. 
82 [d. (citing A.R.S § 14-2104(A), requiring that heirs survive the decedent). 
83 [d. 
54 [d. (citing A.R.S § 14-2108). 
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zona intestate succession laws, the district court determined 
that they were not children of the deceased for purposes of the 
Act.85 
The district court's reasoning in Gillett-Netting-that 
benefits should be denied because the children could not inherit 
under state laws of intestate succession-was consistent with 
the reasoning used by the Administration in the earlier cases of 
Hart and Woodward. In Hart, the Administration denied bene-
fits to a posthumously conceived child because she could not 
inherit under the state law of intestate succession.86 Specifi-
cally, the child was born more than 300 days after her parents' 
marriage ended (upon her father's death) and she was unable 
to prove paternity because her father had not acknowledged 
her as his child before he died.B7 For these reasons, the child 
was not the father's legal child and was therefore deemed ineli-
gible for survivor's benefits.68 
In Woodward, the Administration denied benefits to post-
humously conceived twins even though the plaintiff had ob-
tained a statement from the Probate and Family Court that 
confirmed the paternity of the children.89 The plaintiff ap-
pealed to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which 
determined that posthumously conceived children had the 
same inheritance rights as natural children under the Massa-
chusetts law of intestate succession:o Although the decision of 
the Massachusetts court was not binding on the Administra-
tion, it is illustrative of the problematic nature of the language 
used in the state statutes. 
The intestacy statute at issue in Woodward contained a 
provision for "posthumous children," but this term was not de-
fined. 91 The Massachusetts court noted that in regard to intes-
tate succession, the legislature did not include any wording 
that would require that posthumous children be "in utero" or 
85 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 963. 
86 Banks, supra note 54, at 252 (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 178-180, 184 
(West 1993)). 
87 Banks, supra note 54, at 253 (citing La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 209 (West 1997)); 
see also La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 184, 185 (West 1991). 
88 Banks, supra note 54, at 253. 
89 Woodard, 760 N.E.2d at 260. 
90 [d. at 259. 
91 [d. at 264 (citing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 190, § 8, which provides that 
"[p]osthumous children shall be considered as living at the death of their parent."). 
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"in existence" at the time of the death of the decedent."92 The 
court compared the absence of such language in the Massachu-
setts law with language contained in laws of other states that 
expressly provide "[a] successor must exist at the death of the 
decedent,"93 and "[a] person who dies before a conception using 
that person's sperm or egg is not a parent of any resulting child 
born of the conception,''"' 
Unlike the intestate succession statute at issue in Wood-
ward, the Arizona law at issue in Gillett-Netting did not ad-
dress the issue of posthumous children, except to require that a 
child must survive the decedent or be "in gestation" in order to 
inherit by intestate succession. Because the Gillett-Netting 
twins were not in gestation at the time of their father's death, 
they could not inherit from their father. The Arizona district 
court in Gillett-Netting thus distinguished Woodward on the 
basis of the presence of language requiring intestate heirs to be 
"in existence" at the time of a decedent's death, and on the ba-
sis of the absence of language affirmatively addressing the 
category of posthumous children in the Arizona intestacy stat-
ute:· Arizona law does not address the issue of posthumous 
children except to require that a child must be "in gestation" 
for purposes of intestate succession.96 
2. Determination of Dependency 
A second requirement to qualify for survivor's benefits is 
that the children must have been dependent on their father 
when he died:' Certain classes of children are presumed de-
pendent and do not have to show actual dependency. These 
classes are marital children (including those in utero at the 
time of the parent's death) and those who can inherit from the 
parent under state intestate succession laws.98 An offspring 
who fits into either of these classes is considered a "child" who 
is presumed to be dependent for purposes of the Act. For chil-
92 Woodard, 760 N.E.2d at 264. 
93 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 939 (West 2000). 
94 N.D. Cent. Code § 14-18-04 (1997). 
'" Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 968. See also supra note 93 for Massachusetts 
statute. Arizona has no such provision. 
96 [d. 
97 42 USC § 402(d)(1). 
99 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 967. 
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dren born outside of a valid marriage, certain actions on the 
part of the wage earner will give their offspring the status of 
"child."99 These children, and those born to a marriage made 
invalid by a legal impediment, are also presumed dependent for 
purposes of eligibility for Social Security benefits. 100 
In Gillett-Netting, the Arizona district court found that the 
twins did not qualify for "child" status under the Act; as a re-
sult, it considered the issue of dependency only briefly. 101 The 
district court found that the twins were not entitled to a pre-
sumption of dependency because they could not inherit from 
their father under Arizona law nor could they demonstrate ac-
tual dependency because they did not exist at the time their 
father died. 102 The district court therefore denied benefits to the 
children because they found that the children did not fit the 
statutory definition of "child," they could not inherit under Ari-
zona intestate succession law, and were not actually or pre-
sumptively dependent upon their deceased father. 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT COURT DECISION To GRANT BENEFITS 
1. Benefits Based on "Child" Status and Legitimacy 
The Arizona district court affirmed the decision of the Ad-
ministration that the children were ineligible for survivor's 
benefits, and the plaintiff appealed the district court's decision 
to the Ninth Circuit. 103 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed 
the judgment of the district court. to4 In reaching its decision, 
the Ninth Circuit first determined that because it was undis-
puted that the twins were the biological children of the de-
ceased, they would be considered "children" for purposes of the 
Act. 105 Second, the Ninth Circuit court found that the twins 
were "legitimate" under Arizona law and were therefore pre-
99 42 u.S.C. § 416(h)(3). These actions include acknowledgment in writing by the 
deceased that the claimant is his or her child; a decree by a court that the deceased is 
the parent of the claimant; or a court order requiring the deceased to pay support for 
the claimant because he or she is the child of the deceased. [d. 
100 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii). 
101 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 964. 
102 [d. at 967. 
103 [d. at 963. 
104 [d. 
106 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597. 
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sumed dependent. lOS As a result, actual dependency on the in-
sured wage earner did not have to be shown. \07 
In determining that the Gillett-Netting twins were "chil-
dren" under the Act, the Ninth Circuit, in contrast to earlier 
decisions, did not look to state intestate succession laws. In-
stead, the court relied on Ninth Circuit precedent that had in-
terpreted "child" to mean a natural child or biological child of 
the deceased. \08 According to the court, the provisions of the Act 
that refer to state intestacy law are pertinent only when the 
parents of the child are not married or when the paternity of 
the child is in dispute. 109 Because the twins' parents were mar-
ried before the death of their father and because the paternity 
of the twins was never at issue, the Ninth Circuit concluded 
the children did not have to meet any further standard in order 
to be deemed children of the deceased. 110 
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that "legitimate" children 
are presumed dependent, and by statute all children are con-
sidered "legitimate" in Arizona. 111 The district court had dis-
missed the statute as being "enacted to prevent the State from 
treating children of unwed parents differently than children of 
married parents" and found that it did not support the plain-
tiff's claim. I1' In contrast, the Ninth Circuit looked to the plain 
language of the statute and determined that posthumously 
conceived children were entitled to a presumption of depend-
ency under Arizona law. 
2. Intent of Deceased Parent 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Woodard, like the 
Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting, concluded that posthumously 
106 Id. at 598. See also A.R.S. § 8-601 ("Every child is the legitimate child of its 
natural parents ... "). 
107 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598. 
108 Id. at 596 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 781 n. 12 (1975) and Tsosie 
v. Califano, 630 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1980» ("[T]he term 'child' includes a person's 
natural children and his legally adopted children."). 
109 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598 (explaining that 42 U.S.C. S§ 414(h)(2), (3) 
provide a method for an illegitimate claimant to establish eligibility, and that these 
methods are not needed if the claimant is legitimate). 
110 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597. 
111 Id; see also A.R.S. § 8-601 ("Every child is the legitimate child of its natural 
parents ... "). 
112 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 967. 
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conceived twins were entitled to benefits.ll3 The Woodward 
court based its decision in part on a showing of the father's in-
tent to reproduce posthumously. 114 Like the deceased father in 
Woodward, the deceased parent in Gillett-Netting also ex-
pressed the desire that his wife continue trying to conceive us-
ing his sperm even after his death.1I5 The Arizona district court 
had dismissed the plaintiff's "intent" argument, stating that 
the intent of a decedent is pertinent only to the distribution of 
property through a will. liS By contrast, intestate succession is 
governed by statute; the statute structures the disposition of 
the decedent's property and the decedent's intent is not consid-
ered. 1I7 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit eliminated any need for a 
discussion of the decedent's intent, because it determined that 
the children met the definition of "child" without considering 
whether the children could inherit under state intestate suc-
cession laws. liB 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S RULING 
The Ninth Circuit's ruling in Gillett-Netting represents a 
divergence from the reasoning traditionally employed by courts 
in determining eligibility for Social Security benefits under the 
Act. In the past, courts have based benefits-eligibility on 
whether a child has the right to inherit under state intestate 
succession laws. II. By contrast, in Gillett-Netting, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that a posthumously conceived child need only 
meet the standards of "natural child" and legitimacy under 
state law to be entitled to benefits.12D By looking to the biologi-
cal connection between the deceased parent and posthumously 
conceived child, in combination with a determination of the 
child's "legitimacy" under state law, the Ninth Circuit applied a 
less stringent standard than what the Act seems to require. As 
a result, the ruling in Gillett-Netting may increase the uncer-
113 Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265. 
114 [d. at 272. 
115 Gillett-Netting, 231 F.2d at 963. 
116 [d. at 966-967. 
117 [d. at 967. 
lI8 Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598. 
119 See, e.g., Banks, supra note 54, at 253 (describing Hart u. Shalala No. 94-3944 
(E.D. La. 1994); Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 265. 
120 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1), 416(e) (requiring status as a legal child of the insured 
and dependence on the insured wage earner at the time of his or her death). 
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tainty that is already inherent in the application of the Act. 
This uncertainty arises from the fact that some states have 
laws describing the rights of posthumously conceived children, 
whereas others have yet to address the issue. 
A. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION WILL LEAD TO 
UNCERTAINTY IN THE DETERMINATION OF 
ELIGIBILITY FOR BENEFITS 
1. Uniform Parentage Act 
The first uniform act designed to address the rights of 
posthumously conceived children was the Uniform Status of 
Children of Assisted Conception Act (hereinafter "USCACA") of 
1988.121 The USCACA provides that "[a]n individual who dies 
before implantation of an embryo, or before a child is conceived 
other than through sexual intercourse, using the individual's 
egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child." 122 This act 
was incorporated in the Uniform Parentage Act (hereinafter 
"UPA").123 Under the UPA, a deceased man is generally pre-
sumed to be the natural father of a child if he and the natural 
mother were married to each other and the child's birth occurs 
within 300 days after the marriage was terminated by death.''' 
Assisted reproduction is also addressed in the UPA, which 
states the man who provides the sperm for assisted reproduc-
tion is considered the father of the child, as long as he intended 
to become a parent of the child and both the man and woman 
consent to the procedure in writing.12s In addition, Section 707 
of the UPA states that "[i]f an individual who consented in a 
record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before 
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual 
is not a parent of the resulting child unless the deceased spouse 
consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to oc-
cur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of 
the child. ",26 Under the UPA, therefore, a deceased father 
would have to consent in writing to the use of his sperm, or any 
121 Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act § 4(b) (1988). 
122 [d . 
• 23 Uniform Parentage Act (2002). 
124 UPA § 204 (2002) . 
• 25 UPA §§ 703, 704 (2002) . 
• 26 UPA § 707 (2002). 
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frozen embryos fertilized by his sperm, before the resulting off-
spring could be considered his legal child. 
A few states have addressed the status of posthumously 
conceived children, specifically their legal parentage and the 
impact of this designation on who may inherit through intes-
tate succession, through legislation modeled on the UPA.I27 
However, the various statutes lead to different results, ranging 
from those that prevent posthumous children from establishing 
a legal relationship with the deceased parent to those that limit 
the ability to do so only under certain circumstances. 
2. State Law Governing the Rights of Posthumously Con-
ceived Children 
The Ninth Circuit's decision to award benefits in Gillett-Netting-
based in part on the biological connection between the deceased 
parent and posthumously conceived child-is a result that will 
not be consistently reached under the laws of the various 
states. As a result, claims of surviving children may be denied 
solely as a result of the state where they are domiciled. For ex-
ample, designation as a "natural child" would not seem to be sufficient in 
a state such as Virginia, where the statute concerning assisted 
reproduction is similar to the USCACA. Under the Virginia 
statute, a person who dies before the implantation of an em-
bryo cannot be the parent of any resulting child. 128 The Virginia 
statute, however, has two exceptions that allow the child to 
obtain the legal status of a "child" of a deceased parent. A per-
son may be deemed to be the parent of the child if the deceased 
person consented in writing to being a parent or if implantation 
of the embryo occurs before the physician performing the pro-
cedure learns of the person's death. 129 However, a second Vir-
ginia statute expressly states that for purposes of intestate 
succession, the child must be born within ten months of the 
parent's death. 130 Under these two statutes, a posthumously 
127 UPA § 204 (2002). 
128 Va. Code Ann. § 20-158(B) (Michie 1995). As to embryos implanted before the 
death of the parent, the statute states in part that "[alny child resulting from the in-
semination of a wife's ovum using her husband's sperm, with his consent, is the child of 
the husband and wife notwithstanding that, during the ten-month period immediately 
preceding the birth, either party died." [d. 
129 [d. 
130 Va. Code Ann. § 20-164. 
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conceived child would not qualify as "child" unless her mother 
was impregnated immediately after her father died, even if he 
had stated his intent to father a child. 
There is even more confusion in states such as Florida that 
address the status of a child conceived by means of assisted 
reproduction only in the context of marital children. 131 Off-
spring born within wedlock are presumed to be the "children" 
of the husband and wife, whereas a child conceived after the 
death of a parent is not, even if the biological relationship is 
established. 132 As a result, in these states, although a posthu-
mously conceived child can take under a deceased parent's will, 
she does not have a legal parent-child relationship that would 
allow her to inherit under intestate succession. 133 
Another state, however, directly addresses the issue of 
posthumously conceived children and specifically excludes 
them from any inheritance rights. 13' Under Louisiana law, "le-
gitimate" children are defined as "either born or conceived dur-
ing marriage or [those] who have been legitimated" and 
"[i]llegitimate children are those who are conceived and born 
out of marriage.'''35 No distinction or exception is made for 
posthumously conceived children. 136 
As a result of varying state laws, children may be pre-
vented from establishing natural child status or ability to in-
herit through intestate succession in some states, whereas un-
der the ruling in Gillett-Netting, children in Arizona may get 
benefits under a more lenient test. Moreover, the reasoning of 
the Ninth Circuit in previous cases awarding benefits is not 
consistent with the court's reasoning in Gillett-Netting.137 
131 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.11 (West 1997). 
132 [d. The statute requires that both parents consented in writing to the artificial 
or in vitro insemination. [d. 
133 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 742.17 (West 1997) ("[AJ child conceived from the eggs or 
sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm or 
pre-embryos to a woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's 
estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent's will."). 
134 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 1474 (West Supp. 1996). In Louisiana, to receive an 
inter vivos gift, the child must be in utero at the time the donation was made; to re-
ceive a donation by mortis causa ("in the contemplation of death"), the unborn child 
must be in utero at the time of the testator's death. In other words, children have the 
capacity to inherit only if they exist at the time of the parent's death. [d. 
135 La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 179 and 180. 
136 [d. 
137 Moorehead v. Bowen, 784 F.2d 978 (9th Cir 1986); Moreno v. Richardson, 484 
F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1973). 
21
Minor: Benefits for Posthumous Conception
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2005
106 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35 
Where the Ninth Circuit awarded benefits to a non-marital 
child who had been acknowledged by the father, the court's rul-
ing was not based on the undisputed fact that the child was the 
"natural child" of the insured wage earner and therefore pre-
sumed dependent; instead, the court first relied on the state 
law of inheritance to establish that the child was "legitimate. "'38 
It then determined that this status was sufficient for the child 
to inherit under intestate succession. 130 
In an even earlier case, the Ninth Circuit looked beyond 
the father's admission that he was the father of the non-
marital child in question and instead looked at whether the 
child had been legitimated under state law. I ' o In contrast with 
its reasoning in Gillett-Netting, the wage earner's acknowledg-
ment of being the natural father of the child was not sufficient 
in itself for a determination of the status of "child" for purposes 
of qualifying for benefits under the Act. I ' 1 
B. NINTH CIRCUIT'S STANDARD DOES NOT SERVE THE GOAlS 
OF THE ACT 
Eligibility for survivor benefits is based partially on state 
law, yet the majority of states have not yet determined the 
rights of these children; as a result, this federal law will not be 
applied uniformly across all states. Without clarification of the 
terms used in the Act, the goals of the Administration, includ-
ing avoiding individual determinations of dependency and pro-
viding support for dependents of an insured wage earner, will 
not be met. I ' 2 The Ninth Circuit's ruling would be most persua-
sive where the state statutes expressly address the status of 
posthumously conceived children. 143 When a statute already 
138 Moorehead, 784 F.2d at 978. (noting that under Cal. Prob. Code § 255, a par· 
ent-child relationship was established, making the child "legitimate for purposes of 
inheritance. "). 
139 Moorehead, 784 F.2d at 978. 
140 Moreno v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing Cal. Civ. Code 
§ 230, which states, "[tlhe father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it 
as his won, receiving it as such . . . and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate 
child, thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes 
legitimate from the time of its birth."). 
141 Moreno, 484 F.2d at 90l. 
142 See supra note 8. 
1 .. Ann. Cal. Prob. Code § 249.5 (West 2005). Posthumously conceived children 
are deemed to be born "in the lifetime of the decedent" if the decedent had specified in 
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provides that children in this category can establish a natural 
parent-child relationship that is recognized for purposes of in-
testate succession, the standard put forth in the Ninth Circuit's 
ruling in Gillett-Netting becomes merely an alternative argu-
ment for the granting of benefits. W When state law is not so 
well defined, the ruling in this case can add to the uncertainty 
of the result. 
Using categories for purposes of determining dependency 
of non-marital children has been justified because without the 
categories, dependency would have to be determined on a 
case-by-case basis with several results. 145 First, the definition of 
"dependent" used by each ALJ could differ. 146 Additional costs 
of individualized determinations tend to reduce the level of 
benefits.147 Finally, the greater variability would tax the prin-
ciple that likes should be treated alike. '48 Variations in state 
intestate succession laws that contradict the standard put forth 
by the court will require case-by-case determination of eligibil-
ity for each posthumously conceived child who applies for bene-
fits. 
The goal of the use of legitimacy has been described as the 
prevention of false claims; that is, the denial of benefits is justi-
fied because allowing benefits to non-marital children would 
allow false claims. '49 The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized the possibility that evidence of parentage or support may 
be more likely to be fabricated when the child is not born until 
after the wage earner has become entitled to benefits. 150 This 
rationale could also apply to posthumously conceived children. 
The Court found, however, that false claims were not prevented 
by the policy that divides posthumously born non-marital chil-
dren into two categories for purposes of determining eligibility 
writing that his or her genetic material should be used to produce a child and the child 
of the genetic material is in utero within two years of the person's death. 
144 Cal. Prob. Code §§ 249.5(a)(b)(c) (West 2005) (requiring written confirmation 
by the decedent authorizing the use of his or her genetic material for the conception of 
a child after his or her death, written notice to the person responsible for the distribu-
tion of the estate to make him or her aware of the existence of the genetic material, and 
conception within 2 years of the decedent's death.). 




149 Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 634. 
160 [d. 
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for benefits. 151 Those non-marital children who could inherit or 
were legitimated under state law could qualify for survivor 
benefits,152 while those who did not meet these criteria would be 
denied benefits. 153 The Court held that the blanket exclusion of 
this second category of non-marital children is not necessarily 
reasonably related to the prevention of false claims because the 
potential for false claims is exactly the same for both sub-
classes of non-marital children. 154 
IV. CONCLUSION 
New reproductive technologies require a change in sub-
stantive state law and the clarification of terms used in federal 
and state statutes. Defining statutory terms is often inher-
ently challenging, especially when emerging technology can 
alter the meaning of those terms. The basis of the ruling of the 
Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting diverges from that used in 
many of the lower courts and that used in previous decisions by 
the Ninth Circuit. These courts based eligibility on the right to 
inherit under state intestate succession laws, whereas the 
Ninth Circuit in Gillett-Netting looked at the biological connec-
tion between the parent and child in combination with a de-
termination of legitimacy under state law. By not relying on a 
consistent ground to determine eligibility, the Gillett-Netting 
analysis necessitates a case-by-case determination, contrary to 
the intent of the Administration, when it established categories 
of children. As a result, claims of surviving children may be 
denied solely because of the state they live in. This defeats the 
purpose of the Act, which is to provide support to the survivors 
of an insured individual. The law and terms within those laws 
must be updated to encompass these new technologies and the 
children that result from them. 
151 [d. at 635-637. 
152 [d. at 635-636. 
153 [d. at 636. 
154 [d . 
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